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Researchers in strategy often use agency theory to explain problems arising from the separation of ownership and 
management in corporations. These so-called agency problems occur when managerial activities fail to maximize 
shareholder value. For example, managers might implement strategies that promote their own long-term interests 
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practices that seek closer alignment of share­holder and manager interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency 
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positively associated with shareholder value (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). 
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 Researchers in strategy often use
 agency theory to explain problems
 arising from the separation of own-
 ership and management in corpora-
 tions. These so-called agency prob-
 lems occur when managerial activities
 fail to maximize shareholder value.
 For example, managers might imple-
 ment strategies that promote their
 own long-term interests rather than
 the interests of shareholders. Efforts
 to attenuate agency problems focus
 on adopting governance practices
 that seek closer alignment of share-
 holder and manager interests (Fama
 and Jensen, 1983). Agency theory
 proposes that the board of directors
 monitors managers and constrains
 implementation of inefficient strate-
 gies (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Strat-
 egies ratified by the board that rep-
 resent shareholder interests should
 be positively associated with share-
 holder value (Baysinger and Butler,
 1985).
 Shareholder activists base their
 movement for corporate governance
 reform on principles of agency theory
 (Lorsch, 1996), arguing that agency-
 based corporate governance prac-
 tices increase shareholder value.
 Through their collective influence,
 activist groups have brought about
 significant changes in governance
 practice. However, the impact of
 these changes has not consistently im-
 proved shareholder value in all stra-
 tegic contexts, suggesting that re-
 search in this area should focus on
 individual strategies.
 While often mentioned in accounts
 of poor governance (e.g., Byrne,
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 1997; Lear and Yavitz, 1997), a strat-
 egy unexplored in the research liter-
 ature is layoffs - the most commonly
 used form of organizational downsiz-
 ing (Cameron, 1994). Business Week
 reports, "Rarely a week passes with-
 out the announcement of yet more
 cutbacks, in what has become the
 most unsettling and disruptive event
 in corporate America. ... In
 [1994's] first quarter, employers an-
 nounced an average of 3,106 cut-
 backs per day" (Byrne, 1994: 61).
 Layoffs can cut costs and promote
 more efficient use of labor resources.
 On the other hand, they can have
 considerable negative psychological,
 social, and economic effects. Perhaps
 most obvious is the emotional trauma
 and economic hardship that laid-off
 employees must endure. Less obvious
 are unanticipated costs such as em-
 ployee lawsuits, loss of innovation and
 productivity among survivors, addi-
 tional consulting fees, hiring full- or
 part-time workers to fill unforeseen
 employee gaps, and negative reputa-
 tion effects that make it difficult to
 hire qualified employees (Banham,
 1995; Cameron et al, 1991; Falter-
 mayer, 1992). Because shareholders
 are removed from the managerial de-
 cisions that determine the ultimate
 costs of layoffs, they have turned to
 governance practices as a means of
 aligning managers' decisions with
 their interests.
 Empirical research on the perform-
 ance implications of layoffs generally
 focuses on the impact of layoff an-
 nouncements on shareholder wealth
 (e.g., Chadwell and Filbeck, 1994;
 Chadwell and Webb, 1996; Lee, 1997;
 Palmon et al, 1997; Ursel and Arms-
 trong-Stassen, 1995; Worrell et al,
 1991). However, no study to date in-
 corporates the effect of governance
 practices on shareholder wealth in
 the context of layoff announcements.
 Effort in this direction seems to be
 useful given the simultaneous rise
 and importance of the governance
 movement and corporate layoffs.
 This study examines the impact of
 governance practices advocated by
 activist groups on shareholder value
 in the strategic context of layoffs. We
 draw from three conceptual perspec-
 tives to explore an empirical link be-
 tween characteristics of governance
 and the market's assessment of man-
 agerial decisions to lay off employees.
 First, we use strategic management's
 proposition that managerial strategy
 influences firm performance. Sec-
 ond, as noted, agency theory is the ba-
 sis for assuming that better govern-
 ance practice influences the choice of
 strategies that maximize shareholder
 value. Third, we use capital market
 theory to capture investors' evalua-
 tion of a firm's layoff strategy on fu-
 ture performance. As for specific im-
 provements in governance practice,
 we investigate the following, which
 are widely advocated by activist
 groups: (1) higher proportions of
 outside directors on corporate
 boards, (2) consolidated sharehold-
 ings by institutional investors, and (3)
 greater stock ownership by board
 members (Brown, 1996; Byrne,
 1997). The following question guides
 the study: Do governance practices rec-
 ommended by activist groups influence
 shareholder anticipation of future perform-
 ance in announced layoffs?
 Prior empirical research reveals
 that governance influences perform-
 ance in some strategic contexts, yet
 not in others. Research studies focus-
 ing on the performance implications
 of governance across strategic set-
 tings persistendy resist orderly find-
 ings, making generalizations difficult
 (for example, see reviews by Dalton et
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 aly 1998; Johnson et al, 1996; Zahra
 and Pearce, 1989). We therefore ex-
 tend prior work in governance into a
 new strategic context and examine its
 implications for shareholder wealth
 using a conceptually integrated
 framework. This article specifically
 tests the idea that strong corporate
 governance is likely to increase
 wealth effects associated with the an-
 nouncement of a layoff.
 The remainder of this article is or-
 ganized as follows. First, we review rel-
 evant research on layoffs and govern-
 ance. In the following sections we
 develop hypotheses for each govern-
 ance practice, describe empirical
 methods, and discuss our findings. Fi-
 nally, we present our conclusions and
 their implications.
 LAYOFFS, SHAREHOLDER
 WEALTH, AND GOVERNANCE
 Many research studies investigate
 the relationship between layoff an-
 nouncements and shareholder re-
 turns. Worrell et al (1991) and Ursel
 and Armstrong-Stassen (1995) find a
 significant negative share price move-
 ment following layoff announce-
 ments. Chadwell and Filbeck (1994)
 examine market response to layoff
 announcements in firms that suffered
 extreme losses in market value and
 also find a significant negative share
 price movement. Lee (1997) com-
 pares stock price reactions to layoff
 announcements in U.S. and Japanese
 firms over the period 1990-94, and
 similarly finds a significant negative
 effect. These findings are consistent
 with the popular belief that the stock
 price of firms announcing layoffs typ-
 ically conveys negative information to
 the market (Caseio, 1993).
 Most studies on the stock market's
 reaction to layoffs actually consider
 two types of l yoffs: those used as a
 stand-alone strategy and those that
 are part of a broader organizational
 r structuring (Cameron, 1994; Cas-
 cio, 1993; Lee, 1997; Palmon et ai,
 1997; Worr ll et al, 1991). When lay-
 off announcements mention that a
 layoff is used in conjunction with one
 or mor  other downsizing strategy,
 the market's reaction will be affected
 by the layoff as well as the other strat-
 egies. Evidence exists showing signif-
 icant abnormal returns when each of
 the following are announced as a
 stand-alone strategy: sell-offs (Hir-
 schey and Zaima, 1989), plant clos-
 ings (Blackwell et al, 1990), and early
 retirement programs (Davidson et al,
 1996). These findings raise an impor-
 tant issue about layoffs that are an-
 nounced together with other forms of
 downsizing. Anticipated wealth crea-
 tion due to the layoff cannot be sep-
 arated from the market's reaction to
 the announcement. This has the ef-
 fect of confounding the market's
 evaluation of the loss of human assets
 by including the loss or reconfigura-
 tion of other assets.
 In this study, we use the more re-
 strictive interpretation of layoffs. Our
 sample includes only layoff an-
 nouncements that do not make ref-
 erence to layoffs used in conjunction
 with another downsizing strategy. For
 example, we exclude announcement
 of layoffs resulting from a firm's sale
 r closing of manufacturing plants,
 or from internal consolidation. The
 layoffs in our sample may therefore
 be biased toward firms motivated by
 economic decline, which is not un-
 reasonable given that most of the an-
 nouncements occur between 1989
and 1992, a period of economic re-
 cession. Firms whose layoffs are not
 specifically tied to restructuring are
 more likely to signal attempts to bol-
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 ster competitiveness or to contain
 costs (Freeman and Cameron, 1993).
 When motivated by such factors, lay-
 offs may signal bad news because they
 attempt to minimize losses rather
 than maximize profits. For example,
 the New York Times notes that reces-
 sion "increases the likelihood that
 companies will cut staff, (but) de-
 creases the likelihood that they will
 be satisfied with the results" (Ben-
 nett, 1991: Bl). On the other hand,
 it is probable that some firms use lay-
 offs to sustain or fortify competitive
 advantage when they are not tied to
 restructuring. These proactive layoffs
 would likely signal positive news to
 the market.
 Worrell et al. note that shareholder
 returns are a key strategic variable
 that "reflect the bottom-line results
 of organizational layoff announce-
 ment strategies" (1991: 662). From a
 strategic management perspective,
 investors will use all important infor-
 mation that potentially affects per-
 formance (Lubatkin and Shrieves,
 1986). We contend that, in addition
 to financial information conveyed in
 the layoff signal, investors view firms'
 governance practices as important in-
 formation to help them assess the
 <4bottom-line" results of the an-
 nounced layoff strategy.
 Governance and Shareholders9
 Perception of Layoff Strategies
 In capital market theory, the stock
 market's reaction to an announced
 event reflects all available informa-
 tion (Fama, 1976). However, manage-
 ment has an information advantage
 over investors by knowing how much
 effort it actually intends to put into
 the short- and long-term activities
 that will create current and future
 earnings (Milgrom and Roberts,
 1992). Such formation asymmetries
 ca  compromise the accuracy of in-
 vestors' evaluation of managers' strat-
 egie  (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Val-
 uable inside information influences
 th  content of the signal that firms
 convey in announcements to inves-
 tors (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). Lee
notes that, besides signaling, firms
 use layoff announcements as a form
 of impression management by at-
 tempting to "make work force reduc-
 tions appear proactive rather than re-
 active" (1997: 885). This implies that
 investors may receive inaccurate or
 incomplete information about how
 management intends to execute and
 implement its layoff strategy.
 The basic problem in the preced-
 ing discussion can be viewed using
 the agency perspective. Some top ex-
 ecutives would be expected to have
 the same values as their shareholders,
 while others may use their manage-
 rial discretion selfishly (Oviatt, 1988).
 Shareholders could minimize the
 agency costs of inaccurate or incom-
 plete layoff announcements by en-
 gaging the monitoring activities con-
 ducted by the board of directors and
 major shareholders. Put differently,
 under stronger corporate govern-
 ance, investors could evaluate a firm's
 layoff announcement with greater
 confidence.
 HYPOTHESES
 Of course, the ability to evaluate
 governance in a given firm assumes
 that shareholders are aware of the
 firm's governance practices when a
 layoff is announced. We contend that
 one reason why shareholders are
 likely to be aware of individual gov-
 rnance practices is because they
 draw widespread attention in the me-
 dia, mainly through the efforts of
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 shareholder activist groups. Fortune
 500 firms are routinely evaluated and
 ranked in the business press accord-
 ing to how well they conform to ac-
 ceptable governance practices. A sec-
 ond reason is that majority
 shareholders are often those inves-
 tors most active in governance reform
 and for whom governance practices
 would be essential information. As a
 next step, we make predictions about
 the impact of each governance prac-
 tice on shareholder wealth in the con-
 text of layoff announcements.
 Outside Directors
 Agency theorists contend that out-
 side directors who have no discerna-
 ble ties to the corporation strengthen
 the ability of the board to monitor
 and ratify policies formulated and im-
 plemented by corporate managers.
 Outsiders have less allegiance to the
 CEO than inside directors and are
 more likely to question the policies of
 top management (Baysinger and
 Hoskisson, 1990). They more effec-
 tively align the goals of management
 with those of shareholders (Jensen
 and Meckling, 1976). In doing so,
 they enhance their reputations as
 expert and objective decision makers
 (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
 Research shows that departing in-
 side directors will likely be replaced
 by outsiders when a firm's stock re-
 turns are low (Hermalin and Weis-
 bach, 1988), suggesting that the ap-
 pointment of outsiders reflects
 shareholders' desire for improved
 monitoring (Weisbach, 1988). In sup-
 port of this and also providing evi-
 dence that investors are aware of
 board composition, Rosenstein and
 Wyatt (1990) find positive abnormal
 market returns following the an-
 nouncement of outside director ap-
 pointments. Worrell et al. (1997) find
 th t shareholders respond negatively
 to an in rease in key executive plu-
 rality but positively when an outsider
 is hired into a plural position. More-
 over, the business press reports that
 shareholders seek greater accounta-
 bility of individual directors (Byrne,
 1997; Dobrzynski, 1997b; Witte,
 1997), suggesting an awareness of
 overall composition.
 Investors may sense that a firm will
 incur post-layoff costs that exceed an-
 ticipated gains (Caseio, 1993; De-
 Meuse et al, 1994) because managers
 fail to engage in proper planning and
 implementation (Cameron et aL,
 1991) or lack relevant experience
 and training in layoff strategies (Cas-
 cio, 1993). The more objective views
 and expertise of outside directors can
 make restructuring strategies more
 effective (Jones, 1995; Lear and Yav-
 itz, 1997; Nelson, 1995). The absence
 of objectivity and/or expertise on the
 boards of HJ. Heinz Company,
 AT&T, and Apple Computer can
 help explain layoffs that decreased
 shareholder value (Byrne, 1997;
 Kouskoulas and Raghavan, 1998; Do-
 brzynski, 1997a). Making better layoff
 deci ions also requires developing
 board knowledge on human resource
 issues (Horton, 1991). It seems rea-
 sonable that part of this requirement
 can be met by appointing outside di-
 rectors with expertise in downsizing
 strategies. Another compelling rea-
 son for using outsiders as objective
 and expert monitors stems from an
 increase in board liability litigation
 (Banham, 1995). By improving the
 quality of information and through
 more vigilant monitoring, outsiders
could help reduce the risk associated
 with poor layoff decisions.
 We propose that an agency-based
 nalysis of the link between outside
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 directors and shareholder value leads
 directly to our first hypothesis.
 Hypothesis 1: The market is likely to react less
 negatively, or positively, to layoff announcements
 made by firms with a greater proportion of outside
 directors than firms with a lower proportion of
 outside directors.
 Institutional Investors
 Institutional investors - public and
 private pension funds, investment
 firms, and insurance firms - have in-
 creased their ownership of corporate
 equity from less than 10 percent in
 1970 to over 50 percent in 1998. In-
 stitutions manage shares for third-
 party investors, providing them with
 a strong incentive to influence the
 board and management to ensure
 that their investments are profitable.
 Consistent with an agency theory per-
 spective, consolidation of ownership
 gives institutional investors the incen-
 tives and power to reduce agency
 problems associated with inefficient
 management (Demsetz, 1983; Dem-
 setz and Lehn, 1985). Concentration
 of ownership also makes it increas-
 ingly difficult for investors to sell or
 buy shares, except to other institu-
 tions (Davis and Thompson, 1994;
 Pound, 1992). Instead, they create
 value for third-party investors by in-
 fluencing managements' strategies
 (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). Large
 ownership provides economies of
 scale in gathering information
 needed to monitor management and
 vote according to their constituents'
 interests (Demsetz, 1983). Although
 state and federal laws restrict the per-
 centage of its assets that an institution
 can invest in a single firm and the
 proportion of equity in a given firm
 that it can own, institutions have
 nonetheless become a powerful force
 by efficiently organizing within and
 across corporations. Coordinating ac-
 tions on the basis of their joint hold-
 ings has given institutional investors
 the ability to influence and even pres-
 sure management in poorly perform-
 ing firms. The formation of activist
 organizations such as the Council of
 Institutional Investors has further
 strengthened the power of institu-
 tional investors by providing a singu-
 lar identity and common base for col-
 lective action (Davis and Thompson,
 1994). In an interview with Fortune,
 the General Counsel and Managing
 Director of Fidelity Investments draws
 an insightful agency-based analogy
 that captures the changing role of
 shareholders in corporate govern-
 ance:
 .... I think more communication among
 shareholders, and between shareholders
 and management, is now playing some of
 the disciplinary role that the threat of take-
 overs used to play (Magnet, 1993: 60).
 Interestingly, the role of institu-
 tional investors in creating value is a
 subject of some debate in the busi-
 ness press and academic literature
 (cf., Brown, 1996; Chaganti and Da-
 manpour, 1991; Kouskoulas and Rag-
 havan, 1998). With respect to corpo-
 rate downsizing strategies, some large
 institutions such as TIAA-CREF and
 CalPERS, and activist organizations
 such as the Council of Institutional
 Investors, claim no involvement in
 managerial decisions. Others, how-
 ever, may be more involved. In an in-
 terview with Fortune, the Corporate
 Affairs Manager for the Florida State
 Pension Fund reports:
 The ability to generate return on equity for share-
 holders - not necessarily asset size - should be the
 determinant of the proper size of the corporation.
 They may need to downsize. . . . The key from
 our standpoint is to get the directors thinking
 about that (Magnet, 1993: 60).
 Thus, it would appear that, in addi-
 tion to voting in outside directors
 JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. XI Number 4 Winter 1999
 Influence Of Corporate Governance 481
 who promote shareholder interests,
 institutions can at least indirectly in-
 fluence directors and/ or managers to
 use layoffs. The business press and
 specialty governance publications
 echo this notion (e.g., Heenan, 1993;
 Pensions and Investments, 1996).
 Useem (1996) reports that investor
 pressure to shrink costs can often be
 traced to the size of the workforce,
 leading managers to believe that
 "good" managements will reflexively
 initiate layoffs when employment and
 revenue trends are asynchronous or
 when operations are not lean and ef-
 ficient. Not all institutions applaud
 management's use of layoff strategies,
 however. In the case of Apple Com-
 puter, investors recently chided man-
 agement for not carefully evaluating
 the need for layoffs (Dobrzynski,
 1997b). Shortly thereafter, institu-
 tions were instrumental in adding
 outside directors and changing man-
 agement.
 The foregoing research and anec-
 dotal evidence suggest a link between
 institutional investors and the stock
 market's reaction to layoff announce-
 ments. When firms have a large per-
 centage of shares held by institutions,
 they should signal greater oversight
 of layoff strategies. This would miti-
 gate managerial indiscretions such as
 impression management and have
 positive implications for future per-
 formance. Consequently, we propose
 that the market will perceive layoffs
 more favorably in firms having a
 greater proportion of institutional
 investors: 1
 Hypothesis 2a: The market is more likely to react
 less negatively, or positively, to layoff announce-
 ments made by firms with a greater proportion of
 institutional investors than firms with a lower
 proportion of institutional investors.
 The conditions that lead to a layoff
 will generally develop over a period
 of time as many firms will need to cut
 costs or choose to enhance efficiency.
 If institutional investment promotes
 efficiency and creates value for share-
 holders as proposed, then increases
 in institutional investment over time
 should signal to the market that a
 firm would be better managed and its
 layoff decisions will similarly create
 value.
 Hypothesis 2b: The market is more likely to react
 less negatively, or positively, to layoff announce-
 ments made by firms whose institutional owner-
 ship increases over a three-year period preceding
 the layoff announcement than by firms whose in-
 stitutional ownership did not increase.
 Directors' Stock Ownership
 Poor firm performance could re-
 flect a board's disinterest or uninvol-
 vement in corporate governance. For
 example, boards may not specify ap-
propriate performance benchmarks
 to management (Walsh and Seward,
 1990) or may fail in their ability to
 control management activities and
 proposals that are not in sharehold-
 1 One might argue that a more favorable stock market reaction could be the result of tightly con-
 nected institutions buying up stock and raising their price following management's layoff decision.
 Whereas some stock will be purchased by institutions, we suspect that individual investors wall have
 a substantially greater impact on change in stock value. As Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) and Barr
 (1998) point out, high ownership concentration makes it difficult to sell and buy stock, except to
 and from other institutions. Blair (1965) notes that rapid turnover of institutional investments
 entails high transaction costs and is unlikely to consistently beat market averages. Further, federal
 and state regulations may constrain additional equity investment in a given firm or by a given
 institution.
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 ers' interests (Mallette and Fowler,
 1992). Agency theorists and govern-
 ance activists argue that stock owner-
 ship provides an incentive to direc-
 tors to improve their effectiveness in
 monitoring managers' decision-mak-
 ing activities, increasing the likeli-
 hood that they will actively oppose
 unprofitable activities (Jensen and
 Meckling, 1976). Stock ownership
 gives directors a greater financial
 stake in the wealth effects of their de-
 cisions, leading some activist groups
 to recommend that all director re-
 tainers should be paid in stock
 (Byrne, 1997). Under such condi-
 tions, directors would be more in-
 clined to increase their involvement
 in strategic monitoring (Johnson et
 al, 1993).
 Although we are unaware of sup-
 porting empirical evidence, there is
 reason to believe that investor aware-
 ness of director stock ownership has
 increased as a result of the govern-
 ance movement. In a much publi-
 cized Harvard Business School study,
 for example, directors in the nine
 4 'most admired" companies were
 found to have median stock holdings
 eight times that of a group of nine
 companies that were the target of
 shareholder activist groups (Mc-
 Laughlin, 1997). Given the greater at-
 tention focused on director stock
 ownership by shareholder activists
 and the media, analysts and investors
 are even more likely to consider this
 governance issue when they evaluate
 a layoffs impact on the firm. The
 closer alignment of shareholder and
 management interests anticipated
 when directors own greater shares
 should thus influence the market to
 react more favorably to layoff an-
 nouncements.
 Hypothesis 3: The market is likely to react
 positively, or less negatively, to layoff announce-
 ments made by firms whose directors own a greater
 proportion of company shares than firms whose
 directors own a lower proportion of company
 shares.
 METHOD
 Sample Selection
 Information on layoff events for
 the years 1989 to 1993 comes from
 announcements appearing in the
 Wall Street Journal Index. Of the 241 an-
 nouncements found, we dropped 27
 because daily stock market returns
 are unavailable for these firms on the
 Center for Research in Security Prices
 (CRSP) tapes. We read each Wall
S reet Journal article announcing a lay-
 off and dropped 20 announcements
 that were part of another form of
downsizing (e.g., voluntary separa-
 tion agreements, early retirement,
 and plant closings) .
 We followed sampling procedures
 recommended by McWilliams and
 Siegel, who argue that information
 about the event must be new and rel-
 evant and that controlling for con-
 founding events is * 'perhaps the most
 critical assumption of the (event
 study) methodology" (1997: 634).
 We therefore excluded announce-
 ments that were part of any previously
 announced downsizing strategy or
 showed evidence of prior informa-
 ti n leakage. We excluded announce-
 ments of confounding events such as
 mergers, and changes in dividend
 policy, executives, earnings, and
 bo  ratings. Our screening period is
 th  layoff announcement day plus the
 four trading days preceding the an-
 nouncement (a time frame that falls
 within a range used in most layoff
 event studies). We also excluded an-
 nouncements of temporary layoffs be-
 cause they convey different informa-
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 tion than permanent layoffs (Lee,
 1997; Worrell et al, 1991). A total of
 170 announcements remained. After
 accounting for the availability of data
 for independent variables, our final
 sample consists of 136 layoff an-
 nouncements for 103 different firms.
 Independent Variables
 Proportion of Outside Directors.
 We used proxy statements to identify
 outside directors. Following previous
 research (e.g., Daily, 1996; Daily and
 Dalton, 1994), we classified directors
 as outsiders according to SEC Regu-
 lation 14A, Item 6. We then divided
 outside directors by total board size
 to obtain their proportion.
 Proportion of Institutional Inves-
 tors and Change in Investment. Data
 for both measures of equity owned by
 institutional investors come from the
 Value Line Investment Survey. Propor-
 tion of institutional investment is the
 percentage of common shares held
 by institutions at the time that most
 closely preceded the announcement
 date. Change in level of institutional
 investment is the percentage increase
 or decrease in institutional ownership
 over the three successive annual re-
 porting periods that concluded clos-
 est to the layoff announcement.
 Control Variables. We tested for in-
 dustry effects at the two-digit SIC level
 and found none to be a significant
 predictor in the subsequent regres-
 sion. Results are not shown because
 of the many industries tested. The
 reason for a layoff classified as either
 cost-cutting or efficiency-enhancing
 (Freeman and Cameron, 1993)
 would be a useful control variable.
 Unfortunately, we found most layoff
 announcements to provide poor or
 ambiguous descriptions of the reason
 for layoffs.
 We found the expect d percentage
 of workers affected by the layoff in
 the announcement article. Prior re-
 search shows that the market evalu-
 ates high percentage layoffs more
 negatively than low percentage layoffs
 (Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 1995;
 Worrell et al, 1991). A more negative
 market reaction may also occur when
 a firm makes a layoff announcement
 that is not preceded by previous an-
 nouncements (Lee, 1997; Ursel and
 Armstrong-Stassen, 1995). Using a
 two-year window preceding the event,
 we searched the Wall Street Journal In-
 dex to find previous layoff announce-
 ments and dummy coded a control
 variable to indicate single or multiple
 announcements.
 A firm's size may influence the
 market's reaction to a layoff an-
 nouncement. Economies of scale
 and/ or scope may enable large firms
 to operate more efficiently than their
 smaller counterparts. Large firms
 may have more expertise and re-
 sources and would thus be better able
 to research and implement strategies
 (Mallette and Fowler, 1992). Because
 investors follow larger firms more
 closely, they may require less internal
 monitoring. Institutional investors
 may also prefer investing in larger,
 more stable firms (Bethel and Liebes-
 kind, 1993). Using data from COM-
 PUSTAT, we measured size as the log-
 arithm of sales for the year preceding
 a layoff announcement.
 Event studies show that layoff an-
 nouncements by poor performers are
 more likely to elicit a greater decline
 in shareholder value than announce-
 ments by profitable firms. Profitabil-
 ity is an important control variable
 because investors' expectations of fu-
 ture performance will likely be influ-
 enced by a firm's operating effi-
 ciency. When used in the regression
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 equation, it should help explain how
 well each governance variable pre-
 dicts abnormal returns after account-
 ing for the market's expectation of fu-
 ture returns attributable to operating
 efficiency. Using data from COM-
 PUSTAT, we measured profitability
 as a three-year average of return on
 sales.
 Event Window
 Capturing all new and relevant in-
 formation about the layoff involves a
 tradeoff between longer and shorter
 event windows. Long event windows
 can capture more complete informa-
 tion about the event. As in any event
 study, layoff announcements may be
 preceded by information leakage. For
 example, some Wall Street analysts
 might access inside information that
 could leak prematurely and dampen
 the market's potential reaction to the
 layoff announcement. While leakage
 of information is a distinct possibility,
 we find arguments and evidence in fa-
 vor of using shorter event windows to
 be more compelling (for a detailed
 discussion, see McWilliams and Sie-
 gel, 1997) . Longer event windows re-
 duce the power of the test statistic Zt.
 They also increase the likelihood of
 including potentially confounding
 events and violate the assumption of
 market efficiency (Brown and War-
 ner, 1985; McWilliams and Siegel,
 1997). Empirical evidence suggests
 that short event windows generally
 capture the significance of an event
 (Lubatkin et al, 1989; McWilliams and
 Siegel, 1997). In light of this evidence
 and the fact that firms generally an-
 nounce layoffs during trading hours
 one day before they appear in the
 Wall Street Journal, it is not surprising
 that most layoff event studies to date
 use short event windows (e.g., Chad-
 well and Filbeck, 1994; Chadwell and
 We b, 1996; Lee, 1997; Palmon et al,
 1997; Ursel and Stassen-Armstrong,
 1995) . In this study, we used a two-day
 event window, covering the trading
 day preceding the layoff announce-
 ment and the announcement day.
 Dependent Variable
 We used cumulative average abnor-
 mal returns (CARs) as the dependent
 variable to test market reaction to lay-
 off announcements. The abnormal
 return is the difference between the
 normal market return, predicted by
 the capital asset pricing model
 (CAPM), and the actual return. We
 used daily firm returns and equally
 weighted market returns from CRSP
 to compute market model parame-
 ters for each firm over a one-year
 (240 trading days) period from 331 to
 91 days before the layoff announce-
 ment. We then computed CARs for
 each firm using the market model
 over the two-day event window (t-1, t
 = 0).
 RESULTS
 Table 1 reports the means, stan-
 dard deviations, and Pearson prod-
 uct-moment correlations for the re-
 search variables. Table 2 presents the
 CARs for all layoff announcements.
 GARs are most significant for the fifty-
 day period preceding the event. The
 two-day window chosen (t-1, t = 0)
 has a significant, negative CAR (p <
 .01) and is likely to capture the
 greatest layoff-specific reaction to the
 announcement. We find that the ra-
 tio of positive to negative returns is
 60:76, with a Z statistic of -2.95.
 Regression Analysis
 We tested all hypotheses by regress-
 ing the cross-sectional variation in
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 TABLE 2
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Layoff Announcements
 Days
 -50 to +50 -3.60% -1.61 57:79
 -50 toO -7.23% -4.80*** 50:86"
 -20 to -2 -2.12% -1.44 61:75
 -10 to +10 -1.29% -0.39 64:72
 -10 to -2 -0.79% 0.00 60:76
 -10 toO -1.89% -1.27 63:73
 -5 to +5 -1.19% -1.16 64:72
 -5 toO -1.16% -1.09 68:68
 -4 toO -1.02% -1.06 66:70
 -3 toO -1.12% -1.75 67:69
 -2 toO -0.99% -2.42* 60:76
 -1to0 -1.09% -2.95** 60:76
 -1 to +1 -.49% -0.97 67:69
 0to+1 0.00% -0.37 64:72
 -1 -.46% -0.83 60:76
 0 -.63% -3.24" 54:82*
 +1 .62% 2.67" 72:64
 +2 to +10 -.07% -.08 68:68
 +2 to +20
 *p < .05
 "p < .01
 *"p < .001
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 proves the regression model's ability
 to predict CARs. The results show the
 change in R2 = .056, with F = 5.40
 and p = .057. This suggests a weakly
 significant relationship between the
 incremental gain in shareholder
 value attributable to governance
 practices.
 DISCUSSION
 A central tenet in agency theory is
 that governance practices act to align
 shareholder preferences and mana-
 gerial initiatives. Such is the logic that
 buttresses recent growth in the share-
 holder activist movement. This study
 is the first to investigate the relation-
 ship between governance and share-
 holder wealth in the context of lay-
 offs. Furthermore, it is the first to
 capture the market's response to lay-
 off announcements that focus on hu-
 man assets rather than layoffs an-
 nounced as part of another
 downsizing strategy. Using an agency
 theory perspective, we provide the
 following evidence that the market
 considers governance practices in its
 assessment of layoff announcements:
 ( 1 ) a higher proportion of outside di-
 rectors is modestly associated with
 less negative, or positive, abnormal
 market returns, and (2) an increase
 in the proportion of shares held by
 institutional investors during the
 three-year period prior to the layoff
 announcement is significantly associ-
 ated with less negative, or positive, ab-
 normal market returns. Overall, gov-
 ernance practices improve the
 regression model's ability to predict
 abnormal returns, although at just
 below a statistical significance level of
 p = .05.
 Although not strongly supportive,
 the results of this study are suggestive
 and have several important implica-
 JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. XI Number 4 Winter 1999
 CARs on the independent variables
 described above. Estimation of the
 equation reveals that multicollinear-
 ity is not a problem. Variance infla-
 tion factors were less than 2.0 for all
 variables, which is much lower than
 the rule-of-thumb upper bound of
 10.0 (Neter et aL, 1989).
 Table 3 presents the results of the
 full regression model. Hypothesis 1,
 which predicts that a greater percent-
 age of outside directors is less nega-
 tively, or positively, related to the
 market's response to a layoff an-
 nouncement, is not strongly sup-
 ported. Its value (p= 0.056) lies just
 below an acceptable significance level
 of p<0.05. We therefore suggest a
 weak positive relationship. Although
 positive as predicted by Hypothesis
 2a, greater proportions of shares held
 by institutional investors is not statis-
 tically significant. As Hypothesis 2b
 predicts, there is a significantly
 (p<.05) less negative, or positive,
 stock market reaction when the pro-
 portion of institutional ownership in-
 creases over the three-year period
 preceding the layoff announcement.
 Director stock ownership is positively
 related to the market's reaction to the
 layoff announcement, but is not sta-
 tistically significant, thus failing to
 support Hypothesis 3. Among control
 variables, more positive market reac-
 tions are significantly (p<.001) asso-
 ciated with larger firms. Given the
 "size effect" of a number of large
 firms included in the sample with a
 number of much smaller firms, we
 tested for a downward bias in Kests
 associated with heteroscedasticity.
 Plots of residuals and least squares re-
 gression weighted by firm size fail d
 to reveal heteroscedastic effects. We
 also tested (not shown) whether the
 addition of all governance variables
 to all control values significantly im-
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 TABLE 3
 Results of Regression Analysis of Determinants of
 Market Reaction to Layoff Announcements8
 Independent Variables
 Proportion outside directors .17f 1.93 .02
 Proportion shares held by institutions .06 .73 .00
 Change in level of institutional ownership .17* 2.06 .03
 Proportion of shares held by directors .08 .82 .00
 Previous layoffs announced -.02 -.20 .00
 Percent layoff announced . 1 61 1 .80 .02
 Change in ROS (three- year period) .16f 1.82 .02
 Sales .39" 3.52 .07
 R2 .25***
 Adjusted R2
Standardized regression for the full model is shown; η = 136.
 fp<.i0
 'p < .05
 " *p < .01
 " ρ < .001
 tions. As predicted by agency theory
 and espoused by governance activists,
 the market reacts less negatively, or
 positively, to layoffs announced by
 firms whose boards have greater pro-
 portions of outside directors.
 Whether outsiders actually make for
 a more independent board that pro-
 tects shareholder interests, or are
 merely perceived as such, the market
 reacts more negatively when outsid-
 ers comprise lower proportions of to-
 tal board size. Therefore, the market
 appears to take into account the im-
 proved monitoring of outsiders in its
 assessment of layoff announcements.
 Our findings run contrary to those in
 other contexts where outsiders are
 not perceived as objective and inde-
 pendent. These results could be used
 by activist groups as justification for
 adding outsiders to the board. More-
 over, because the findings focus on
 human assets, boards might be en-
 couraged to add outsiders with rele-
 vant experience in human resource
 management as a way to improve
 monitoring layoff strategies. We also
 find stock ownership by institutions
 to be consistent with the expectations
 of agency theory and governance ac-
 tivists, but instead of institutional
 ownership per se, the market places
 greater value on the trend in institu-
 tional investment. Besides having fi-
 duciary responsibility to their clients,
 institutions often cannot easily buy
 and sell shares. They would likely be
 cautious investors, prepared to hold
 their investments for a longer time
 period and take measures to stem de-
 clining performance. After control-
 ling for profitability, rising propor-
 tions of shares held by institutions
 over the three years prior to the layoff
 announcement appear to signal a
higher level of commitment and
 monitoring capability to the market.
Layoffs in firms that experience
growth in monitoring over time
 would be moving toward closer align-
 ment with shareholder interests and
 JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. XI Number 4 Winter 1999
 Influence Of Corporate Governance 489
 evaluated less negatively, or posi-
 tively, than layoffs in firms that stag-
 nate or decline in monitoring over
 time. As Kochhar and David (1996)
 note, growth in institutional invest-
 ment over time signals the firm's abil-
 ity to make regular improvements in
 performance. This finding supports
 activists' general contention that in-
 stitutions should continue to increase
 their investment in firms over time.
 Our findings also show that inves-
 tor reaction to layoff announcements
 depends largely upon the size of the
 firm, with big companies more likely
 to experience an increase in share-
 holder value. Because of their re-
 sources, large firms may be perceived
 as better able to cut employees as a
 response to stressful conditions.
 When not responding to stressful
 conditions, proactive measures taken
 to improve efficiency may well be per-
 ceived as a positive move toward trim-
 ming the fat that is frequently associ-
 ated with large organizations.
 This study should stimulate interest
 in related research. One reason why
 governance practices were not
 stronger predictors of the market's
 response to layoff announcements
 may have to do with the time frame
 of our sample. The awareness of gov-
 ernance issues and practices has in-
 creased steadily since 1993, the last
 year in the sample. Future research
 should address this issue to capture
 changes in governance practice and
 their eff ct on the market's percep-
 tion of layoffs over time. Such post-
 recession s mples should similarly al-
 low researchers to classify layoff
 announcements as reactive or proac-
 tive to determine the relative impor-
 tance of governance in each case. We
 assume in this study that directors
 and institutional investors will moni-
 tor managers' layoff strategies. Al-
 though there is some supportive evi-
 dence of involvement in recent
 popular business publications, re-
 search studies need to further inves-
 tigate this issue. Finally, prior re-
 search shows that the effectiveness of
governance structures varies accord-
 ng to strategic context. Future re-
 search needs to consider the per-
 formance implications of governance
 structures in other types of corporate
 downsizing strategies, such as early
 retirement and voluntary separation
 agreements, divestitures and spinoffs,
 plant closings, and structural consol-
 idations.
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